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When Noble Means Hinder Noble Ends *The Benefits and Costs of a Preference for Martyrdom in Altruism*

CHRISTOPHER Y. OLIVOLA

The decision to donate one's money and time is a particularly interesting kind of choice because it involves trade-offs between personal, self-interested goals (i.e., goals that primarily benefit the decision maker) on the one hand, and collective, altruistic goals (i.e., goals that contribute to the greater good) on the other. Why and how people make altruistic choices has been a topic of great interest in many fields, including philosophy, biology, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. As a result, plenty of energy has gone into devising models and theories that can explain altruistic behaviors or provide normative standards for how we *should* make decisions when faced with trade-offs between personal well-being and collective welfare. In this chapter, I start by considering two normative standards for making donation choices, which I call *Pareto hedonism* and *Pareto utilitarianism*. Next, I briefly review literature that suggests that people may not always be motivated to follow these standards, instead preferring means of charitable giving that involve significant pain and effort—a phenomenon called the *martyrdom effect*. I then discuss recent research showing that, as a result of the martyrdom effect, donation decisions often violate both Pareto hedonism and Pareto utilitarianism. I conclude by discussing the implications and dilemmas that result from this preference for challenging forms of altruism.

THE *SHOULD* OF GIVING: NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN DONATION DECISIONS

Most theories of decision making have focused on the consequences of people's choices (Baron, 1994; Hastie, 2001; Messick, 1999). Although they come in many flavors, we can distinguish two broad types of *consequentialist* theories. At one extreme, theories such as the standard neoclassical economic model assume that decision makers only care about maximizing their own personal utility, not the utility of others (Rabin, 2002). In these models, rationality implies very little or no altruism and the prototypical *rational actor* is a purely selfish decision maker (in the narrow sense). Of course, we know this isn't the case in reality. Most people are often willing to donate some of their time and money to help others. Consider, for example, the fact that private giving in the United States totaled \$295 billion in 2006 (Wing, Pollak, & Blackwood, 2008). Thus, people seem to be characterized by what Mullainathan and Thaler (2001) call "bounded self-interest." At the other extreme, utilitarian theories prescribe bringing about the greatest total good by maximizing aggregate utility (i.e., collective welfare). The most stringent utilitarian models typically imply that people should sacrifice as many of their own resources (including time and money) as possible until the cost of doing so exceeds the total benefit they provide to others (for a discussion of utilitarian models, see Baron & Szymanska in this volume). But we know this doesn't occur either. As utilitarian moral philosophers have correctly pointed out, many of us could be doing more to help others in need at relatively negligible costs to ourselves (Singer, 1993, 2009; Unger, 1996). Thus people are also characterized by bounded altruism.

Since people are limited both in their selfishness and their altruism, it is unrealistic to expect that they will always follow the prescriptions of neoclassical economic theories or those of utilitarian moral theories. Decisions about whether, when, how, and how much to donate are more likely to be governed by a mix of personal and prosocial goals than by either set of goals alone. In fact, many behavioral economic models of decision making now include parameters for other-regarding utility, in addition to standard self-regarding utility (e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002). In doing so, they have formalized the combined influence of selfish and prosocial considerations in shaping people's choices. As a result, these models can account for a much larger variety of choices, both selfish and altruistic, than their more traditional neoclassical predecessors. Under these models, the concept of rationality encompasses a much broader set of behaviors. Similarly, not all utilitarian models require us to make heavy personal sacrifices. As Baron and Szymanska (in this volume) explain, some versions of utilitarianism recognize that most people are not willing to give away most of their resources, even if doing so brings about more collective good than personal harm. Under these more relaxed utilitarian models, a larger set of choices can be considered morally acceptable. In sum, the traditional and normatively stringent economic and utilitarian models of decision making have given way to more complex and flexible normative theories. Consequently, more choices are normatively defensible.

Nonetheless, we might still expect decision makers to abide by some minimal normative standards, even within these newer models. In particular, trade-offs between

selfish (personal) and altruistic (prosocial) goals should be constrained by two principles, Pareto hedonism and Pareto utilitarianism, which I define as follows:

1. *Pareto hedonism*: Whenever decision makers can increase their personal utility without decreasing the benefits to others, they should do so.
2. *Pareto utilitarianism*: Whenever decision makers can increase the utility of others without decreasing the benefits to themselves, they should do so.

These principles borrow from the economic concept of *Pareto efficiency* (or *Pareto optimality*), by which a state of affairs is considered efficient if no transactions (i.e., reallocations of resources) can make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. While pure self-interest or pure altruism may be too stringent for most people to follow or even to accept in principle, Pareto hedonism (the notion that a person should strive to improve their own state of affairs if they can do so without sacrificing others' welfare) and Pareto utilitarianism (the notion that a person should strive to improve others' states of affairs if they can do so without sacrificing their own resources) should be easy to follow since they don't require any sacrifices. Furthermore, these principles have a nice normative characteristic: they neither violate rational-choice models that assume pure self-interest nor moral codes of conduct that prescribe pure altruism. We should therefore expect all decisions to follow the principles of Pareto hedonism and Pareto utilitarianism. In this chapter, however, I will review recent evidence that people violate both of these principles, sometimes simultaneously. But first, I present a brief discussion of some existing literature that helps explain why this happens.

EVIDENCE OF A GENERAL PREFERENCE FOR MARTYRDOM

Our everyday experiences show us that we often gain more satisfaction from achieving difficult goals (i.e., those involving effort and pain) than we do from those we achieve with ease. Indeed, a number of researchers have argued that people derive meaning and value from having to work hard and suffer for their chosen goals (Baumeister, 1991; Berns, 2005; Higgins, 2006; Kaufman, 1999; Lane, 1992; Loewenstein, 1999). These assertions are supported by various lines of research showing, for example, that people assign more value to objects they have worked hard to earn than those they have obtained with minimal effort (Lewis, 1965; Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994), that actively obtained rewards are associated with greater activation of certain brain reward systems than those obtained passively (Elliott, Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 2004; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004; Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, Chappelow, & Berns, 2004), and that consumers are more hesitant to frivolously spend their earned income than their unearned income (Abdel-Ghany, Bivens, Keeler, & James, 1983; Arkes et al., 1994; Henderson & Peterson, 1992; Keeler, James, & Abdel-Ghany, 1985).

Our own research (Olivola & Shafir, *submitted*), which I discuss below, shows that in some cases, people will contribute more to a cause if doing so is painful and

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effortful (either for themselves or for a friend) than if the contribution process is easy and enjoyable. We call this phenomenon the martyrdom effect, as it essentially involves people suffering for a cause they believe in and care about. Much as martyrs are often assigned a special symbolic status (Cormack, 2002; DeSoucey, Pozner, Fields, Dobransky, & Fine, 2008; Fields, 2004; Glas, Spero, Verhagen, & van Praag, 2007), people seem to derive additional meaning and value from the pain-effort that they (or close others) anticipate enduring for a chosen cause. For many, the word *martyrdom* is associated with religion and fanaticism. However, there is a more general definition: According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2008) a *martyr*, in its broadest sense, is “a person who undergoes death or great suffering for a faith, belief, or cause,” while *martyrdom* is “the act of becoming or the condition of being a martyr.” We can simplify and combine these definitions to obtain the following definition of *martyrdom*: The act of suffering for a cause. Thus, by martyrdom, I simply mean the act of engaging in hedonically aversive activities (i.e., involving various kinds of difficulties and discomforts, such as pain, effort, and/or the risk of death) for a chosen cause.

As the above literature suggests, human beings often seem to show a preference for difficult and dangerous means of achieving goals and supporting causes. In the next few sections, I show how this tendency to value and reward martyrdom in altruism leads to violations of both Pareto hedonism and Pareto utilitarianism.

VIOLATIONS OF PARETO HEDONISM: THE SUCCESS OF PAINFUL-EFFORTFUL FUNDRAISERS

When it comes to decisions about how to donate to a charitable cause, the principle of Pareto hedonism implies that people should always prefer less costly methods of donating money over more costly ones, all else being equal. Yet this doesn't seem to be the case. Some of the most popular and successful fundraisers involve a good deal of pain and effort (Symonds, 2005). Many people, it seems, aren't just willing to give to charity; they'll go to great lengths to do so—literally! Popular fundraising events include walk-a-thons, marathons, bike-a-thons, swim-a-thons, triathlons, and other endurance events where donors must exert physical effort over an extensive period of time to help raise money for charity. Contrary to what we might expect, a large proportion of the participants in these events are not athletes; many of them are inspired by the charitable cause to participate in a dauntingly effortful event that they would otherwise avoid (Sweeney, 2005). In fact, this approach to raising money for charity seems to be growing in popularity at an astonishing rate (Williams, 1995). As an illustrative example, consider the March of Dimes. In 1970, when its first walk-a-thon fundraiser was organized, approximately 1,000 walkers participated and raised a total of \$75,000. By 2003, the March of Dimes was holding well over 1,000 walk-a-thons per year and raising more than \$100 million through these events (Napoli, 2003). Moreover, painful-effortful fundraisers are not limited to endurance events. Other variants include walking barefoot on burning coals (“Firewalkers,” 2004; “Pub-goers,” 2002) and broken glass (Barry, 2006; Birks, 2006), fasting for an extended period (Gardiner,

2007; Russell, 2004), and jumping out of planes (Lee, Williams, & Hadden, 1999) to raise money for charity.

Not only are painful-effortful fundraisers quite popular (i.e., attract many donors), they may also increase the amount of money that charities raise per donor, relative to less painful-effortful events. To explore this hypothesis, I examined data on the average amount of money raised, per participant, by endurance fundraising events that vary quantitatively in terms of physical effort involved. This data was obtained from two large national health-related charity organizations in the United States, each of which focuses on combating different diseases. Both charities organized regular endurance fundraising events to raise money for their respective causes and kindly shared some of their data with me.

The first charity organized an endurance cycling event in the northeastern United States, and provided data on the mean amounts raised, per cyclist, between 2005 and 2007 period. One characteristic of this bike-a-thon is that participants could vary the amount of effort they put into raising money, by cycling either 25, 50, or 170 miles (40.2, 80.5, or 273.6 km). These data automatically control for a range of possible factors since all cyclists started from the same physical location on the same day, and were cycling for the same cause, regardless of the distance they chose. Figure 4.1 shows the mean donations raised by cyclists for each distance in 2005, 2006, and 2007. For all three years, there is a positive correlation between the distance cycled and the amount of money raised. Those who cycled the shortest distance (25 miles) raised an average of \$239.49, those who cycled twice as far (50 miles) raised an average of \$426.00, while those who chose the most effortful option (170 miles) raised the most: an average of \$1,085.69. Although the minimum




Figure 4.1 Mean donations raised per charity fundraising cyclist as a function of cycling distance and event year. Individual donations could not be obtained (only means were available), so calculation of the error bars was not possible. However, sample sizes were available for each bar and are as follows (from left to right): $N = 438, 705, 500, 433, 700, 478, 391, 554,$ and 374 .

contribution required to enter the bike-a-thon did correlate with distance (\$75, \$150, and \$300, to cycle 25, 50, and 170 miles, respectively), it doesn't fully account for the differences in donations raised. For example, although one had to contribute \$75 more to enter the 50-mile bike-a-thon than the 25-mile one, the former raised \$186.51 more than the latter. Similarly, although one had to contribute \$150 more to enter the 170-mile bike-a-thon than the 50-mile one, the former raised \$659.69 more than the latter one. It should also be noted that the willingness to participate did not vary linearly with distance: Substantially more people chose to cycle 50 miles than either 25 or 170 miles (the latter two distances were comparable in terms of their popularity). This suggests that although people may be motivated to suffer for a cause, there are (not surprisingly) limits to the distance they are willing to go.

The second charity organized a variety of endurance events (e.g., walk-a-thons, marathons, and triathlons) across several locations in the United States, and provided some data on the individual-level amounts raised by participants between 2004 and 2008. These events differed both qualitatively (i.e., they involved walking, running, cycling, swimming, or a combination thereof) and quantitatively (i.e., the distance to run, walk, etc., varied across events). To control for qualitative differences, I only compared events that differed primarily in terms of the distance traveled. For example, this charity organized both marathons and half-marathons, which differ mainly in terms of the distance participants must run (26.2 miles vs. 13.1 miles). Figure 4.2 shows the mean donations raised by participants as a function of the distance traveled (i.e., effort invested) and the type of endurance event (only nonzero donations were considered). Again, we see that the amount raised by participants correlated positively with the effort they invested. Furthermore, this was true for all three types of events that I considered (i.e., those for which variations in distance existed).




Figure 4.2 Mean donations raised per charity fundraising participant as a function of event type and event distance. Error bars represent standard error. The sample sizes associated with each bar are (from left to right): $N = 79, 89, 62, 49, 20, 55,$ and 16 .

These results are suggestive and offer real-world (i.e., nonlaboratory) evidence that making charity fundraisers more challenging increases the amount that participants are able to raise. However, these data lack explanatory power. A number of factors could account for the positive relationship between the amount of effort invested by fundraising participants and the amount of money they raised. This is where experimental approaches can significantly advance our understanding. In contrast to observational and correlational methods, experiments can be used to isolate and manipulate the factors that may be responsible for the success of painful-effortful fundraising events. In doing so, they allow us to determine the causal relations linking these factors. Below I review experimental evidence that the addition of pain and effort can increase willingness to contribute to a prosocial cause.

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF THE MARTYRDOM EFFECT IN CHARITABLE GIVING

In order to clarify the factors and causal links underlying the success of painful-effortful fundraisers, my colleagues and I carried out a number of experimental studies (Olivola & Foddy, submitted; Olivola & Shafir, submitted). In one set of studies (Olivola & Shafir, submitted), we found that participants who imagined the prospect of participating in a charity fundraiser were willing to donate more to the charitable cause when the hypothetical fundraiser was expected to be painful and effortful (e.g., a charity endurance run) than when it was expected to be easy and enjoyable (e.g., a charity picnic), even though both events were said to be equally popular (i.e., the same number of people were said to participate in both cases). In another study involving real money and actual pain, participants each made an anonymous decision about how to divide a budget between themselves (a personally beneficial allocation) and a collective financial pool where money was doubled and evenly redistributed to all members of the group (a collectively beneficial allocation). Participants allocated significantly more of their budgets to the collective cause when doing so required keeping their hands immersed in near-freezing cold water for 60 seconds (a rather painful task) than when no such task was involved. As a result, participants in the painful, cold condition ended up with higher payoffs than those in the control condition. Critically, the former participants made their allocation decisions *before* experiencing any pain, which rules out a number of alternative explanations for our results, such as cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). One interesting result was that this manipulation had no effect on their beliefs about what other members of their group would do, which suggests that they were not drawing inferences about the perceived value of donating from the presence of the painful task. Furthermore, the anonymity of their decisions meant that they could not convey signals or gain status through their allocation choices, so these were not the driving factors behind their allocation preferences.

These studies also showed that the martyrdom effect extends from the self to others. Specifically, participants indicated a greater willingness to donate to a charity, following a hypothetical friend's solicitation for contributions, when she

anticipated participating in a painful-effortful fundraising process for the same charity (as opposed to when she asked them for contributions without anticipating a painful-effortful fundraising experience). Moreover, the effect was not attributable to the friend's perceived dedication, since participants were willing to contribute more when the friend had a difficult fundraising experience than if she happened to enjoy the event, even though in both conditions she initially anticipated that it would be quite unpleasant. And the effect held only when the money donated was *directly associated* with the pain and effort (to be) experienced by the friend: When the friend was going to suffer for a charity unrelated to the one for which she solicited donations (thereby dissociating participants' contributions from her pain-effort), donations were the same as when she asked for donations without anticipating a painful-effortful fundraiser. This suggests that the martyrdom effect is not just about feelings of obligation or pity for a friend about to suffer for a worthy cause.

Finally, we found that the martyrdom effect could be moderated by the nature of the charitable cause: When the nature of the cause and the type of fundraiser were congruent, willingness to donate was higher than when both were incongruent. In other words, a painful-effortful fundraiser was more successful than an easy, enjoyable one when the charitable cause was associated with human suffering (starving children in developing nations), but not when it was associated with enjoyment (a public park). The importance of congruency in promoting charitable giving is interesting and seems to extend beyond the cause-fundraiser relationship. For example, Croson and Shang (in this volume) review evidence that the tendency for potential donors to be influenced by another donor's contributions increases when the latter is somehow similar to the former (e.g., same gender), so congruency between current and previous donors seems to also play a role. Ratner, Zhao, and Clarke (in this volume) review evidence that people show more deference toward to an advocate or volunteer for a cause when this person has a personal stake in the cause. For example, in one study, participants were more likely to respond positively to an advocate/volunteer for a cause related to disease A when that person had a parent who died from disease A, but not when the same person had a parent who died from disease B. This suggests a potential role for a form of advocate-cause congruency in donation decisions.

In sum, these studies show that people clearly seem to be violating the principle of Pareto hedonism by choosing to suffer for a cause when they could make the same contribution without doing so (e.g., by simply sending a check). What about the principle of Pareto utilitarianism?

VIOLATIONS OF PARETO UTILITARIANISM: WHY PAINFUL-EFFORTFUL FUNDRAISING IS INEFFICIENT

The principle of Pareto utilitarianism implies that charities and donors alike should always prefer the most efficient method of raising money for a cause, all else being equal. In other words, the goal should be to produce the highest contribution-to-cost

ratio, so that limited resources of money and time can produce the largest possible benefits for the recipients of these donations. However, and despite the fact that willingly suffering for a noble cause may seem praiseworthy (*a noble means*), this approach to charitable fundraising is often highly inefficient, and thus violates Pareto utilitarianism.

For one thing, painful-effortful fundraising events are very costly means of raising money for charity. A study of charitable fundraising activities in 2007 (Charity Navigator, 2007) found that special event fundraisers (of which painful-effortful fundraisers are a special case) cost charities \$1.33 per dollar raised, representing a net loss (by contrast, the overall average cost of fundraising was only \$0.13 per dollar raised). In fact, for only 15% of the charities in the study sample did special events seem more beneficial than regular fundraising activities. One conclusion of the study was that many health charities would benefit from relying less on special events as means to raise money.

Painful-effortful fundraisers are also inefficient in terms of energy and time usage. The calories that participants burn to complete endurance events do not generate direct benefits for the charitable cause. As I argue in the concluding section, this energy could be put to better use. Similarly, the hours spent training for these events and participating in them constitute another important opportunity cost, which might be better spent at work, earning money for the cause. Through their efforts to raise money for charity, which include months of training for painful-effortful events and door-to-door fundraising, participants are failing to make full use of their professional skills and earning potentials.

Finally, these events can pose serious health hazards (Sweeney, 2005), adding medical expenses to the cost of organizing these events. In one illustrative study (Lee, Williams, & Hadden, 1999), researchers performed a cost-benefit analysis of parachuting for charity in one region of Scotland. They found that, rather than producing a net benefit, each pound raised for charity cost the National Health Service (NHS) £13.75 in parachute-related injuries. Ironically, approximately 70% of these donations were for NHS-related causes. As the study's authors aptly note: "Parachute jumping for charity is not cost-effective in raising money, as the cost of treatment of the 11% who are injured is far in excess of any money raised by the rest."

In sum, a preference for martyrdom in altruism not only leads people to seek out painful, effortful, and sometimes dangerous means of raising money for charity (a violation of Pareto hedonism). It also violates the principle of Pareto utilitarianism, since many painful-effortful fundraising practices are highly *inefficient*, with some even producing net losses (despite the fact that they often attract larger donations, on average).

In nearly all of our experiments, however, participants were *either* presented with a painful-effortful fundraiser *or* an easy, enjoyable one, but not both options at once. One might therefore object that in these studies (and in the examples presented so far), the opportunity costs associated with painful-effortful fundraising may not have been salient at the time of the donation decision (Frederick, Novemsky, Wang, Dhar, & Nowlis, *in press*). In a separate, but related, line of work (Olivola & Foddy, submitted), we made these trade-offs and opportunity costs quite prominent for participants, to see whether this would reduce their preferences

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for altruistic martyrdom. To do so, we developed an ethical dilemma scenario involving two hypothetical American physicians: One who joins *Médecins Sans Frontières* (*Doctors Without Borders*), earns \$18,000 per year, and saves 200 lives each year through his work; another who starts a private practice in Hollywood, earns \$700,000 per year, but donates \$20,000 to *Médecins Sans Frontières* and, in doing so, saves 500 lives each year. We asked a sample of students, researchers, and professionals, all working in the fields of medicine, health, or humanitarian aid, to directly compare the decisions made by these two physicians and to indicate which career choice they would prefer. Barring “exotic” preferences, the Hollywood private practice clearly dominates, since it offers a higher salary (i.e., greater personal utility) and saves more lives (i.e., greater total welfare). And yet, the majority of our respondents considered the *Médecins Sans Frontières* career (which involves living in very poor and often dangerous parts of the world) to be preferable. In other words, they considered it better to live in a harsh environment, lead a challenging lifestyle, and be directly involved in humanitarian health efforts than to lead a comfortable lifestyle and contribute indirectly through donations, even though the former option ultimately leads to many fewer lives being saved. This provides a striking demonstration that people can hold preferences that simultaneously violate Pareto hedonism and Pareto utilitarianism, despite being made keenly aware of the opportunity costs involved.

WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT ALTRUISTIC MARTYRDOM? IMPLICATIONS FOR CHARITY FUNDRAISING

People are clearly motivated to partake in painful, effortful, and sometimes dangerous efforts to raise money for charity and to support others who engage in such efforts—a phenomenon we refer to as the martyrdom effect. Our own research suggests ways that charities can harness this paradoxical preference for martyrdom in altruism, while also pointing to some boundary conditions on this tendency (Olivola & Shafir, submitted). These studies show that organizing painful-effortful fundraisers can often increase the amount that participants and their sponsors are willing to donate for a cause, relative to easy and purely enjoyable means of raising contributions. However, adding pain and effort to the fundraising process seems to be more effective when the target cause is associated with human suffering (e.g., raising money for the victims of disease, malnutrition, or war) than when it is associated with human pleasure (e.g., raising money for a museum, a children’s sports team, or an orchestra). Thus, health-related and humanitarian aid charities are the most likely to benefit from painful-effortful fundraising. We also noticed that adding pain-effort to the fundraising process had a small, but systematic, effect on decisions about *whether* or not to participate (and thus to donate), such that a consistent fraction of potential donors in our studies seemed to be deterred by the prospect of having to endure great pain and effort. Charities, therefore, are likely to maximize contributions by organizing fundraisers that are painful-effortful enough to be perceived as challenging (so as to boost donations from participants and their sponsors), yet not so daunting that large numbers of potential donors are deterred from even participating.

Although the specific mental processes underlying the martyrdom effect have yet to be fully elucidated, some of the research I have reviewed suggests that it occurs because people derive satisfaction and symbolic value from engaging in, or supporting, painful-effortful activities that contribute to a charitable cause. Simply put, the act of donating may seem more “special” when it involves great personal sacrifice and, in particular, some amount of suffering (Ramos, 1999). The implication seems to be that people care a lot about the *means* of achieving altruistic goals. In doing so, however, they may lose sight of the *consequences* and *opportunity costs* involved (Frederick et al., in press). Indeed, I have provided evidence that altruistic martyrdom can be highly inefficient in terms of organizational costs, health costs, and time spent preparing and engaging in painful-effortful events. This highlights an important dilemma. In many cases, much more money could be raised if, in place of the hours training for and participating in endurance events, donors spent that time at work and donated the resulting wage. However, if people are motivated by the challenges inherent in painful-effortful fundraisers, then they may be resistant to replacing those events with easier means of contributing, even if the latter are more cost-efficient. One solution might be to replace running, biking, and other popular endurance events that do not, in themselves, contribute to charity, with more useful, but equally challenging, activities. Imagine, for example, an event where participants must plant trees, help build (or rebuild) homes, serve food, pick-up trash, or package medical supplies, to raise money for charitable causes. These activities could be just as physically engaging as standard endurance events, provided that participants set challenging goals for themselves (e.g., planting a certain number of trees within a specified time limit). By participating in fundraisers of this sort, participants would have a dual positive impact through their donations *and* the fundraising act itself. Furthermore, this bundling of altruistic goals, whereby donors and sponsors can simultaneously contribute to two charities for the cost of one, might prove highly appealing (see Strahilevitz, in this volume).

CONCLUSION

The research covered in this chapter shows that people violate two very basic, but important, consequentialist principles of rationality and morality: *Pareto hedonism* (the notion that decision makers should always opt to reduce the disutility they experience from helping others if they can do so without decreasing their altruistic contributions) and *Pareto utilitarianism* (the notion that decision makers should always opt to increase their altruistic contributions if they can so without increasing the disutility they experience from helping). These violations pose theoretical and practical problems. On a theoretical level, even modern consequentialist economic models of decision making, which incorporate both selfish and altruistic goals, fail to explain these violations of self- and other-regarding utility. On a practical level, a preference of martyrdom in charitable giving often leads to highly inefficient means of raising contributions. A challenge for future researchers, policy makers, and charities will be to devise fundraising practices that tap into our motivation to suffer for altruistic causes, while also minimizing the opportunity costs involved.

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